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ouchers are a method for financing government 
services by which clients are given coupons of 
prescribed value for use at any eligible service 
provider. Vouchers for K–12 education continue to 
attract interest, offering the promise of greater parental 
choice, enhanced school efficiency, and improved 
educational outcomes for students.   
NEW RESEARCH ON EDUCATION VOUCHERS  
 
Research on vouchers has not only examined their 
academic benefits; it has also considered how parents 
choose schools, how schools operate, and how 
vouchers influence public finances. These investiga-
tions are useful for informing program design and for 
setting vouchers within the broader context of school-
choice reform.     
 
The first formal voucher program was established in 
Milwaukee in 1990; by 2003–04, 12,778 students were 
participating across 107 schools. Its practical success 
was followed by programs developed in Cleveland, 
Florida, Colorado, and Washington, D.C. (see Belfield 
and Levin 2005). At their most basic, these programs 
offer an “existence proof” for vouchers. With them has 
come sustained academic inquiry into education 
vouchers and their anticipated effects.   
 
In looking at school-choice decisions by parents, it is 
clear that many affluent families already have 
choices; attention therefore focuses on how voucher 
programs might open up choices for those families 
who are constrained.  Thus far, all voucher programs 
have been targeted to low-income families or to 
districts with low-performing schools. Clearly, choice 
sets are being expanded for low-income families. 
However, several mediating factors make voucher 
programs less equitable in actuality than is implicit in 
a simple reading of the program eligibility rules. 
First, religion pervades family preferences of schools 
(Campbell et al. 2005).  Certainly, parents value high 
test scores, but preferences are varied, with many 
families choosing their neighborhood school.   
Second, race has a strong influence on school-choice 
decisions. This relationship is complicated by 
different patterns in Hispanic and African American 
children and by the fact that public schools show 
strong patterns of racial segregation. However, 
vouchers consistently lead to greater student 
segregation (even in a highly minority public school 
system such as Washington, D.C.). Third, school 
choice is an action; that is, parents must actually use 
the voucher to change their child’s school, 
conditional on eligibility and having new choices.   
Consistently, usage rates are much lower—perhaps 
by one-third—than offer rates (Howell and Peterson 
2002, table 2). Moreover, even within low-income 
groups, the children most likely to succeed in school 
are the ones most likely to utilize the voucher (as are 
 
Here we summarize this evidence to establish styl-
ized facts about vouchers. The evidence is then used 
to inform evaluation of the Cleveland Scholarship 
Program (CSP), including its effects on students’ test 
scores. Established in 1995, the CSP now has par-
ticular prominence because, in 2002, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling Zelman vs. Simmons-Harris 
resulted in federal approval of inclusion of religious 
schools in voucher programs. Although operating for 
almost 10 years, the status of the Cleveland program 
had still been uncertain; with the legal challenge re-
solved, the CSP is now affirmed, and more vouchers 
are being offered across all school grades. In 2005, 
Ohio ratified a statewide version of the CSP to be 
introduced in 2006: This will provide as much as 
$5,000 each for up to 14,000 students enrolled in 
schools that receive the state’s lowest performance 
ranking for three straight years. Evidence on the effi-
cacy of the program is therefore critical, both for the 
direct development of policy in Ohio and for voucher 
initiatives in other states. 
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white students). Also, a nontrivial proportion of those 
who receive vouchers are already in private school.   
 
Research has also investigated the supply of private 
schooling. Without supply, family preferences be-
come meaningless, and, if private schools do not 
operate in ways distinct from public schools, there is 
no advantage to students choosing them.   
 
Several consistent findings emerge from the research 
on supply. Most participating schools are religious 
(across various faiths); secular schools have a small 
market share. The supply of new schools appears 
reasonably elastic: For example, almost one-half of 
the schools participating in the Milwaukee program 
were founded after it was introduced. But voucher 
student enrollees are increasingly a majority within 
their schools: by 2001, 40 percent of the schools 
participating in the Milwaukee program had more 
than 80 percent of their students claiming vouchers. 
However, research on the inputs and technologies 
that private schools use (beyond selecting their 
students) and on which are more efficient has yielded 
very little: Economists are still no further ahead in 
identifying the separate benefits of ownership, 
innovation, and technical efficiency, that is, which 
inputs work best (Hanushek 2004). After controlling 
for student characteristics, most research finds only 
very modest advantages to private school. Finally, 
greater competition is likely to improve schools’ 
performance (Belfield and Levin 2002), but the 
competitive pressures exerted by small-scale voucher 
programs are also likely to be modest.   
 
Further research has examined how voucher 
programs might impinge on the existing public 
school system and its local financing.  Because 
schooling is financed locally, individual school 
choices will feed back into house prices and district 
spending and, therefore, school quality. Nechyba 
(2003) reports several novel results from modeling 
the introduction of large-scale voucher programs.   
First, competition for high-ability students would 
increase; these students would pay lower tuitions, 
both as a result of the voucher and as a consequence 
of schools’ greater eagerness to enroll them. Second, 
public schools would engage in more ability tracking 
to prevent high-ability students from switching to 
private schools. Both factors suggest further 
educational inequalities, with greater rewards (and 
resources) for high-ability students. Third, public-
school quality is most likely to decline in middle- or 
high-income school districts. Importantly, opinions 
about vouchers are likely to be driven more by 
perceived effects on property values than by 
educational outcomes; homeowners may be wary of 
education reforms that may raise uncertainty as to the 
value of their home.   
 
The most high-profile research on vouchers has 
looked at whether they raise student achievement.   
The evidence here shows, at best, moderate advan-
tages for voucher participants.   
 
For the Milwaukee Program, Rouse (1998) found 
small but positive effect-size differences of   
0.08–0.12sd per year for math but no effect for 
reading. However, the data were from the first five 
years of the program—religious schools were not 
participating, and the voucher students were 
concentrated in a few schools. For the Florida 
program, Figlio and Rouse (2005) found modest 
results from data on over 180,000 students. Voucher 
users in initially low-performing schools do post 
higher test scores, but much of this is  attributable 
either to student characteristics or to teaching to the 
high-stakes test. Randomized field trials for vouchers 
in three cities found small test-score gains after three 
years (Howell and Peterson 2002). These treatment 
effects were primarily for African Americans in one 
setting, with no evidence of cumulative gains for 
those who used the voucher for the longest periods. 
Finally, it is worth noting that new evidence from 
expanded public-school choice points to the same 
conclusion, with few achievement gains from 
placement in a choice school (Cullen et al. 2005).   
 
CLEVELAND SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM  
 
The Cleveland Scholarship Program operates in the 
Cleveland Municipal School District (CMSD), which 
has 75,000 students across 130 schools. Eligible 
schools are nonpublic, chartered schools located 
within the CMSD and approved by the state superin-
tendent. Surrounding public-school districts are 
eligible to apply, and 5,734 students currently par-
ticipate in the program. Initial enrollment in 1996 
was 1,996, with total funding of $5 million. Eligible 
children had to be in grades K–8, reside within the 
CMSD, and not require segregated special education. 
Low-income families were given preference, with 
those below 200 percent of the poverty level given 90 
percent of tuition or $2,250, whichever was lower;  
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families above 200 percent of the poverty level were 
given 75 percent of tuition or $1,875, whichever was 
lower.  About one-fourth of the students came from 
the latter group. In comparison, per-pupil expenditure 
in CMSD in 1996 was $7,500 (including transport). 
In 2003–04, scholarships were made available for 
ninth grade and beyond, and funding was increased to 
$3,000 for grades K–8 and set at $2,700 for higher 
grades. Where voucher applications exceeded avail-
able placements, a lottery system was used.   
 
Despite its usefulness for informing future voucher 
reforms, the Cleveland Scholarship Program has been 
the subject of little academic inquiry. The program is 
large enough to allow for samples of students 
according to voucher status and religious schooling, 
and with recent data, it offers an up-to-date evaluation 
of vouchers in light of recent school-choice reforms. 
Given the duration of the program, it is possible to 
examine the question of dose response (i.e., whether 
persistence in the program yields higher rewards). 
Also, CMSD has a high proportion of African 
American students, for whom vouchers are held to be 
most beneficial. Importantly, the CSP voucher is 
relatively ungenerous: if effects can be found for this 
program, it is likely that achievement gains would be 
even larger for more generous programs.   
 
To identify effects, it is necessary to classify students 
according to voucher status: users (offered and used a 
voucher to attend private school); non-users (offered a 
voucher but did not use or stopped using it); applicant 
rejects (applied for but not offered a voucher); 
eligibles (could apply but did not); and ineligibles (not 
eligible according to program rules).  Here, these last 
two groups are conflated into a general public-school 
comparison group.   
 
The potential for bias in identifying effects from 
vouchers is high. Three kinds of bias are particularly 
important, but their effects are (probably) offsetting for 
this program. Applicant bias occurs when only those 
who apply for the voucher are likely to benefit from it. 
This will bias gains toward users because applicants 
are typically from motivated families. Eligibility bias 
occurs when those who are eligible differ both from 
those who apply and (separately) from those who do 
not apply. This will bias gains away from users, 
because CSP eligibility is conditional on low family 
income. (It is possible with these data to control for 
eligibility). Usage bias occurs when those who use the 
voucher differ from those who do not use it, 
conditional on application and eligibility. This will 
bias gains in favor of users relative to non-users 
because usage is positively correlated with ability and 
family resources. In addition, data collection inevitably 
generates some response bias as survey attrition rates 
are higher for non-users.  
 
EVALUATING THE CSP 
 
Since 1996, the CSP has been evaluated by the 
Center for Education Evaluation at Indiana 
University (see Metcalf et al. 2003). The evaluation 
began with collecting data for those entering 
kindergarten in 1997 and has continued up to sixth 
grade in 2003. (No substantive changes in program 
design occurred during this period, but the legal 
status of the program was only resolved in 2002). 
The data set includes over 4,000 students who attend 
more than 100 separate schools. In terms of voucher 
status, the data set is composed of users (23 percent), 
non-users (10 percent), applicant rejects (16 percent), 
and a public-school comparison group (51 percent).   
 
The data set has three advantages: it is longitudinal 
(including achievement measures); it includes stu-
dents from multiple comparison groups; and it is a 
large sample spread across many different schools. 
However, the public group does not precisely con-
form to the above categorization: It includes both 
eligibles and ineligibles as part of a general compari-
son group. Also, the sample sizes are considerably 
lower because of attrition and missing responses.   
 
Evidence on the CSP comports with extant research. 
Specifically, most students chose religious schools, 
and high (and growing) proportions of voucher 
applicants and users had previously been enrolled in 
private schools. Table 1 shows information on 
selected student characteristics across voucher status.  
This, too, conforms with other studies. African 
American students and low-income students (free-
lunch eligible) are much less likely to use the 
voucher, conditional on being offered it. 
 
To identify the achievement gains from the voucher 
program, we estimate a series of education 
production functions. The impacts of voucher status 
on achievement are reported in table 2. Terra Nova 
test scores in second and fourth grade are regressed 
against a set of student and school characteristics, 
including prior-year test scores (see table 2, notes).  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Voucher Status (Second-Grade Students) 
 
  Voucher 





Black 56%  75%  58%  48% 
Hispanic 7%  4%  6%  3% 
Free-lunch eligible   58%  83%  50%  49% 
N   624    326      438  971 
These impacts are effect-size gains relative to the 
public-school comparison group in reading, math, 
and language. 
 
The top panel of table 2 shows that voucher status has 
mixed effects. For reading, there are no statistically 
significant differences across the four groups in second 
grade. For math, voucher users report the lowest 
scores: the statistically significant effect size is 
  –0.09sd against the public-school group and of 
comparable size against the other two groups. In 
contrast, for language, the public-school group does 
considerably worse than the other three groups; how-
ever, the voucher-user group gains the least—both 
non-users and rejected applicants show larger 
advantages. Given the biases that might lead to 
statistically significant gains for voucher users, we 
cannot find evidence that voucher students outperform 
relevant comparison groups in second grade. 
Moreover, the bottom panel shows that by fourth 
grade, the math penalty for voucher users persists, but 
the gains in language have dissipated to insignificance.  
 
Additional testing using second-grade data affirms 
the weakness of any voucher effects. When we do not 
control for prior achievement, the results do not favor 
voucher users: The math penalty is maintained, and 
the language advantage over the public-school group 
is eliminated. Moreover, the rejected applicants 
report statistically significant test-score gains in 
reading and language. When we compare users only 
against those who were not offered a voucher (the 
treatment effect), users report scores that are lower by 
0.14sd in reading and 0.11sd in math, with no 
difference in language.  When we examine whether 
those who have participated the longest in the 
program obtain the strongest effects, we find mixed 
effects across the three subjects. Finally, we test for 
whether the impact of vouchers differs by race. 
Restricting the sample to African American students, 
voucher users appear more disadvantaged: Their 
reading scores are now statistically significant and 
lower (–0.14sd); the math penalty is still evident (but 
not statistically significant); and the language 
advantage is not discernible. These sub-analyses give 
no indication that vouchers have a differential and 
beneficial impact for African American students.   
 
Overall, there is no clear advantage for voucher 
students; if anything, there is a slight academic 
Table 2: Effect-Size Test-Score Gains over Public-School Students 
 
 Reading  Math  Language 
Second Grade:       
  Voucher user  –0.060    –0.092**   0.097** 
 Non-user  –0.019      –0.021 0.162* 
  Rejected applicant    0.083   0.026   0.136** 
N 1733  1786  1736 
Fourth Grade:       
  Voucher user    0.043     –0.113***  0.038 
 Non-user  –0.065    0.044  0.076 
  Rejected applicant  –0.030  –0.055           –0.063 
N  2089  2102             2085 
Notes: Terra Nova test.  OLS estimation.  Effect sizes control for subject-specific first- 
and third-grade scores; African American; Hispanic; female; free-lunch eligible; 
unsubsidized lunch; class size; and years of teacher experience.  * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
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penalty. However, given that in 2001 the value of the 
voucher was less than $2,400 and the opportunity 
cost in the public school system was approximately 
$8,800, it might be concluded that the voucher 
program is cost-effective. Yet, back-of-an-envelope 
calculations show that this conclusion is premature.  
The CSP voucher does not include transportation, 
which must be paid by the district, nor does it include 
standardized assessments, which public schools must 
impose. It does not cater to special-education 
students or the most disadvantaged students (who do 
not take up the voucher). And, because the program 
is sub-additive, for every three vouchers distributed, 
approximately one student would have attended 
private school anyway. There are also additional 
administration costs.   
 
Finally, the $8,800 figure for CMSD is the average 
cost per student, not the marginal cost. With 
approximate costs of transport, assessment, special 
education, sub-additivity, and administration taken 
into account, the anticipated fiscal saving falls from 
$6,400 ($8,800-$2,400) to perhaps $2,500–$3,000. 
Although this is still a sizeable cost saving, it does 
not account for marginal costs, student disadvantage, 




Recent research sheds light on the efficacy of 
vouchers. Broadly, it may be questioned whether 
vouchers—even with some modest achievement 
gains—will be a catalyst for educational 
improvements. On the demand side, there are many 
steps before parents actually exercise choice. On the 
supply side, most of the participating schools are 
religious, with little evidence of new secular schools 
either opening or accepting vouchers. Competition 
will probably be muted.  General equilibrium models 
explain why homeowning voters are wary about 
expanding voucher programs.           
 
The Cleveland Scholarship Program readily fits into 
this general pattern, evincing similar features to 
voucher programs in Milwaukee, Florida, and now 
Washington, D.C. Although targeted at students from 
low-income families, these programs in fact serve 
those somewhat closer to the middle of the income 
distribution, when usage rates and prior schooling are 
accounted for. Students are highly likely to be in reli-
gious schools, and African American students are 
less likely to use their vouchers. Importantly, the CSP 
results are not encouraging with respect to achieve-
ment: The program shows a slight academic penalty 
for voucher users relative to other comparison 
groups. Thus, it seems unlikely that an expanded 
statewide program will radically enhance educational 




1 For a full version of this paper, see C.R. Belfield’s 
“The Evidence on Education Vouchers: An Applica-
tion to the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring 
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